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space outside of self for phenomena" (p. 196). We should say that our concepts, the concepts motion and space included, represent certain features of reality. We might give a special name to those features of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space, but we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time denying the validity of the concepts.

Says Professor Pearson, "All things move—but only in conception" (p. 385). "What moves in conception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves because we conceive it to move." These propositions have no meaning if pronounced from our standpoint. Observe also that Professor Pearson inculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the word in the formula on page 341 which begins as follows: "Every corpuscle in the *conceptual* model of the universe must be *conceived as moving*. . . ." When we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in the conceptual model, but also in reality there is an action taking place which we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge only of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we describe as mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety. The point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to deal with them properly. If it does it answers the purpose.

In spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with the author of "The Grammar of Science," for we agree with respect to the principles of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our differences to a common test on the basis of these principles. Moreover, the attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take ourselves. We quote from a former publication of his, the following passage \*:

"I set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought is no longer to  
 "batter down old faiths; that has been long ago effectively accomplished, and I,  
 "for one, am ready to put a railing round the ruins, that they may be preserved  
 "from desecration and serve as a landmark. Indeed I confess to have yawned over  
 "a recent vigorous indictment of Christianity, and I promptly disposed of my copy  
 "to a young gentleman who was anxious that I should read a work entitled: *Nat-  
 "ural Law in the Spiritual World*, which he told me had given quite a new width  
 "to the faith of his childhood."

κρς.

PHILOSOPHIE DER ARITHMETIK. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen.

By Dr. E. G. Husserl. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.

The present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the philosophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of psychological and logical investigations, the scientific foundation for a future construction of this disci-

\* The book from which we quote, namely *The Ethic of Freethought*, like the book here under discussion, contains much detail matter in which we differ most emphatically from the author; (he is, for instance, in our opinion very unjust to Martin Luther;) but it seems to us that he pursues an aim that we have in common with him.

pline, which would be of equal value to the mathematician and philosopher. The first volume which is now before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality, unity, and number, so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect symbolisation. The second part considers the symbolical representations of plurality and number, and the author attempts to show that the fact of our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number determines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author calls "*Anzahlenarithmetik*."

The author criticises several theories which in different ways explain the origin of plurality and unity. There is one theory which explains the origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness; there is another one which explains the origin of number from a succession in time. F. A. Lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception, and Bauman declares there is something mathematical in the external world which corresponds to the mathematical in us. The theory of difference held by Jevons, Schuppe, and Sigwart, is declared to be superior to all others, but even that is rejected by the author. Jevons says, "Number is but another name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with difference rises plurality. . . . Abstract number then, is the empty form of difference." Dr. Husserl objects: if numbers are all empty forms of difference, what makes the difference between two, three, four, etc.? The contents of these numbers are very different. The inability of defining this difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference. Dr. Husserl proposes what he calls "collection" as a special method of combination by which unities are formed.

Although the book contains many valuable suggestions, it is very hard reading. The author's views are not at all clearly set forth. Neither is the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a clue to the plan of the book, nor is there any index that might give us assistance in finding out the most characteristic passages. The reader is supposed to read the book right through, in order to understand detached chapters or even sentences. And even then we are not sure whether or not we have understood the author's propositions the consistency of which is not as apparent as it might be expected. For, after having criticised so many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas, plurality, unity and number, and after having proposed definitions, explanations, and analyses of his own, we find on p. 130 a passage where these ideas are incidentally declared to be incapable of definition. Speaking of Frege's theory, Dr. Husserl says, "As soon as we come down to elementary concepts, all definition has an end. Such concepts as quality, intensity, "place, time, etc., cannot be defined. The same is true of elementary relations, "and of those concepts upon which they are founded. Equality, similarity, gradation, whole and part, plurality and unity, etc., are concepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition. All we can do in such cases is to produce "the concrete phenomena from which they have been abstracted, and to explain "the method of this process of abstraction. One can, where it is necessary, exactly fence in (*umgrenzen*) by diverse circumscriptions, the concepts in question,

"and thus prevent confusion with kindred concepts." We must confess that we do not understand the author's idea ; what is an act of defining if not an "umgrenzen," a fencing in of the concept? The book contains many similar passages, which, it seems to us, are not properly thought out by the author. But the subject is a difficult one, and, as the author says in the preface, "A work of this kind should, with regard to the difficulties of the problem it treats, be judged with leniency."

KP.

CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY. Both or Neither. By the Rev. Daniel Lyons. New York : Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Chicago : A. C. McClurg & Co.

This little book of Dr. Lyons's is got up in a much more substantial and prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from Catholic quarters. It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the *Nihil obstat* of a Catholic "censor deputatus" and with the *Imprimatur* of the Bishop of Denver. In this book, therefore, the reader may be sure that he possesses a correct exposition of Catholic doctrine.

The purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis,—a thesis always insisted upon by the Catholic church,—"that Christianity, to maintain its rightful hold on "the reason and conscience of men, needs a living, infallible Witness to its truths "and principles; a living, infallible Guardian of its purity and integrity, and a living, infallible Interpreter of its meaning." By Christianity Dr. Lyons means "that body of sacred truths which the Almighty revealed through the *ministry* of "Christ and His Apostles."

We italicise the word "ministry," for on this word hinges in our judgment the main and unmistakable argument of Dr. Lyons's advocacy. If the results of modern Biblical criticism are at all true, the "Church," so-called, must have existed before the New Testament. And in establishing the authority of the church, the Catholic theologians regard and use the Bible merely as an "historical narrative, "whose trustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same way "as that of any other history, sacred or profane." They take their argument "for "the institution, mission, and authority of the Church from the Bible as a mere "human record of the sayings and doings of our Divine Lord and His Apostles." What is the mission of the church? "*And he said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned.*" These are awful powers, and awful are the sanctions placed by the same Divine letter-patent in the hands of the institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great complexity and peculiar nature of the Holy writings, in view of their recognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation, does not such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily and logically imply a concession of Infallibility—of infallibility, let us add, as *technically* understood. "Who can suppose that God would "formally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear and